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Essays on International Migration
Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga
International migration happens because individuals
want to increase their personal welfare by moving to a new
country. In addition, it has effects on the welfare of those
who decide not to migrate and remain in their origin countries. This dissertation looks at the overall topic of international migration from three very different angles: 1) who the
migrants are or the study of the productive characteristics of
migrating individuals with respect to nonmigrants, 2) what
the long run effect of migration is and specifically whether it
can contribute to Social Security sustainability, and 3) why
countries sign bilateral migration agreements to try to regulate migration flows.
In Chapter 1, “New Evidence on Emigrant Selection,”
I examine the extent to which Mexican emigrants to the
United States are negatively selected; that is, they have lower
skills than individuals who remain in Mexico. Previous studies have been limited by the lack of nationally representative
longitudinal data. This one uses a newly available household
survey, which identifies emigrants before they leave and allows a direct comparison to nonmigrants. I find that, on average, U.S.-bound Mexican emigrants from 2000 to 2004 earn
a lower wage and have fewer schooling years than individuals who remain in Mexico, evidence of negative selection.
This supports the original hypothesis of Borjas (1987) and
argues against recent findings, notably those of Chiquiar and
Hanson (2005). The discrepancy with the latter is primarily
due to an undercount of unskilled migrants in U.S. sources
and secondarily to the omission of unobservables in their
methodology.
Studying emigrant selection is relevant because it affects
welfare and its distribution both in immigrant-receiving and
in emigrant-sending countries. Thus, economists have long
tried to explain how emigrants self-select. On the theory side,
Borjas (1987) stated that most immigrants should be low
skilled when the reward to skills or earnings inequality in
their home country is higher than the reward to skill or earnings inequality in the receiving country. This is the case between Mexico and the United States (2006) so that negative
selection, meaning that emigrants are on average less skilled
or productive than those who do not migrate, should characterize migration flows between the two countries. However,
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) found that Mexican immigrants
in the United States originated in the medium-high range
of the Mexican wage distribution, which is interpreted as
evidence of positive selection. Their data on Mexican immigrants came mainly from the U.S. census, which is known
to suffer from undercounting immigrants, especially if they
are undocumented. Other studies finding positive selection
were mainly based on the Mexican Migration Project, which
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provides detailed information about a particular region in
Mexico but is not representative of the whole country.
This chapter addresses these data problems by using the
Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Trimestral (ENET) and the
Quarterly National Labor Survey (INEGI). This household
survey is representative at a national level and it follows
households for five quarters so that it allows recovering the
wage income and other characteristics (like education) of
Mexican emigrants (both documented and undocumented)
in the previous quarter to that in which they decided to leave
the country. The wage distribution of Mexican emigrants
is shifted to the left of the wage distribution of Mexican
nonmigrants for both men and women. As long as the wage
is a valid measure of the marginal product of labor, this
implies that Mexican emigrants to the United States are on
average less productive than those who remain at home. In
conclusion, the main result of this chapter is the existence of
negative selection in the emigration flows from Mexico to
the United States for the period 2000–2004.
The procedure to test the selectivity of emigrants from
Mexico to the United States is similar to Chiquiar and
Hanson’s (2005) methodology. They compare the 1990 and
2000 distribution of wages from individuals in the Mexican census with the counterfactual wage densities Mexican
immigrants to the United States would obtain were they to
return to Mexico according to their characteristics in the
corresponding U.S. census. Chiquiar and Hanson follow the
DiNardo et al. (1996) approach to build counterfactual wage
densities and find they lie to the right of the actual resident
wage distribution, interpreting this as evidence of positive to
intermediate selection in terms of observable skills reflected
in the wage. The ENET does not require the construction of
counterfactual wage densities since actual wages of future
emigrants can be observed directly. The only exercise is to
estimate wage densities for migrants and nonmigrants based
on the direct observation of their wages at the same period
and to compare them. Contrary to Chiquiar and Hanson, I
find evidence of negative selection in terms of skills (both
observable and unobservable) reflected in the wage levels.
The comparison of the schooling distributions of migrants
and nonmigrants also displays negative selection.
The discrepancy between this chapter and Chiquiar and
Hanson could be related to three factors. First, their results
reflect selection in the stock of migrants in the United States,
obtained from the U.S. census, whereas the information in
the ENET corresponds to selection on the flow of migrants.
Second, their methodology cannot take potentially relevant
unobservable characteristics into consideration in the estimation of counterfactual wages. Third, U.S. sources are known
to undercount Mexican immigrants. All three explanations
can be explored with the ENET data.
In order to address the first point, stock versus flows,
whenever I replicate Chiquiar and Hanson’s result, I use
information only on recently arrived Mexican immigrants.
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Recently arrived migrants are those who have only been in
the United States for less than a year, the closest possible
concept to measuring flows in U.S. sources. To investigate
which of the two other factors is responsible for the differences in results, I first ignore the information on emigrant
wages from the ENET and use only the emigrants’ observable characteristics to counterfactually estimate their wage
levels. I find that negative selection still characterizes the
emigration flows, although the degree of selection is lower
than the one obtained when actual wages are employed. This
is evidence that there is negative selection on both observables and unobservables. It follows that the methodology
biases the result toward finding positive selection, although
not enough to overturn the negative selection outcome. I
then ignore all the information on emigrants available in the
ENET and use data on recently arrived Mexican immigrants
from U.S. sources instead. In this case, I find that the results
are consistent with those of Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), and
positive selection is obtained. These results suggest that the
undercount of low-skilled immigrants in U.S. data sources
is the main reason why this chapter finds negative selection
whereas Chiquiar and Hanson find positive selection.
In the case of the other group of studies finding positive emigrant selection from Mexico to the United States,
their main drawback is that the data sources used are either
incomplete (the U.S. census undercounts Mexican undocumented immigrants and the Mexican census does not record
the education level of emigrants) or nonrepresentative at a
national level (MMP), which forced researchers to impose
strong assumptions on the data. For example, I show that using the MMP as representative of Mexico is misleading since
the ENET shows that rural Mexico is actually characterized
by positive selection and the general negative selection result
is driven by urban Mexico. In fact, it can be said that this
chapter does not contradict any previous work but rather
complements their main inconveniences.
Chapter 2, “Fiscal Sustainability and Public Debt in an
Endogenous Growth Model,” coauthored with Jean-Pierre
Vidal, investigates fiscal sustainability in an overlapping
generations economy with endogenous growth coming from
human capital formation through educational spending. We
assess how budgetary imbalances affect economic dynamics
and the outlook for economic growth, thereby providing a
rationale for fiscal rules ensuring sustainability. Our results
show that the appropriate response of fiscal policy to temporary shocks is not trivial in the absence of fiscal rules. Fiscal
rules allow for a timely reaction, thereby avoiding possibly
disruptive fiscal adjustment in the future: the more adjustment is delayed, the larger its necessary scale is. We perform
a rough calibration of the model to simulate the effects of a
demographic shock (change in the population growth rate)
under different fiscal policy scenarios. The demographic
shock can also be interpreted as a change in the immigration rate so that the model can be used to study the effects
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of immigration on key macroeconomic variables in a partial
equilibrium setting. It is partial equilibrium in the sense that
immigrants do not respond to wage differential but are modelled as an exogenous shock instead.
The tax and transfer system examined in this chapter
is fairly rich. Pension benefits are assumed to be paid in a
lump-sum manner. Individuals pay a proportional tax on
labor income and at the same time they either pay a lumpsum tax or receive a lump-sum transfer. Labor income
taxation is characterized by high top marginal tax rates and
relatively lower average effective tax rates, reflecting the
progressiveness of income taxation. This is well captured in
our model by combining a proportional income tax with a
lump-sum transfer. In addition to the tax-benefit system, the
government finances general public spending, which benefits
individuals but does not distort their economic decisions, and
issues bonds. As individuals maximize utility and therefore
react to fiscal policy, the model provides a suitable framework to inquire about fiscal sustainability.
Overlapping generations’ models are suitable theoretical tools to address fiscal sustainability issues. Since the
Ricardian equivalence does not apply in these models and
debt dynamics are in general unstable, fiscal rules are needed
to maintain fiscal sustainability. There are two sources of
economic growth in our model: the accumulation of physical capital and the formation of human capital. The accumulation of physical capital stems from individual savings.
Endogenous growth results from the formation of human
capital, which is assumed to result from parental education
and educational spending, financed out of altruism. The
human capital part of the model includes another channel
through which government debt affects the economy. Not
only is physical capital crowded out by government debt,
but human capital is as well so that the growth potential of
the economy is affected. In other words, not only the steady
state level of capital is altered, as it is in existing exogenous
growth models, but also the growth rate.
The main findings are the following. First, the existence
of steady states is not sufficient to ensure fiscal sustainability.
Second, in the presence of multiple steady states, the initial
conditions in the economy matter for the long-run equilibrium that will result from economic dynamics. Third, the
stability properties of the economy depend on the set of fiscal
instruments, that is, on the adopted fiscal rules. Fiscal policy
rules are generally needed to ensure the stability of equilibria
that are dynamically efficient.
The appropriate response of fiscal policy to exogenous
temporary shocks is not trivial in the absence of fiscal rules.
If temporary small shocks occur in the neighborhood of a
stable steady state, there is no strong case for adjustments
to fiscal policy, as the economy can come back to its initial
position by itself. However, when temporary shocks occur
in the neighborhood of an unstable steady state, which is the
standard case in an economy with public debt, they endanger
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fiscal sustainability. Without timely reaction to such shocks,
ensuring fiscal sustainability would require adjustments, possibly of a disruptive nature, in the future: the more the adjustment is delayed, the larger its necessary scale is. Fiscal rules
preserving fiscal sustainability seem more appropriate to deal
with small shocks, as they timely maintain the economy on a
sustainable path and do not lead to disruptive adjustments.
We illustrate this point by performing a rough simulation
in which a baseline version of our model, parameterized to
fit the values of economic variables in the pre-enlargement
European Union, is exposed to a demographic shock. To be
precise, we assume that the projected decrease in population
happens in the next 50 years and show how this can lead to
unsustainable debt unless a fiscal rule is introduced.
Chapter 3, “The Case for International Cooperation in
Migration Policies,” explains how unilateral migration
policies impose externalities on other countries. In order to
try to internalize these externalities, countries sign bilateral
migration agreements. One element of these agreements is
the emphasis on enforcing migration policies: immigrant-receiving countries agree to allow more immigrants from their
emigrant-sending partner if they cooperate in enforcing their
migration policy at the border. I present a simple theoretical
model that justifies this behavior by combining a two-country, two-good classical Ricardian model with welfare-maximizing governments. These governments establish migration
quotas that need to be enforced at a cost (modeled according
to Ethier [1986]). I prove that Nash unilateral migration
policies are inefficient whereas both countries can improve
welfare by exchanging a more “generous” migration quota
or terms of trade advantages for expenditure on enforcement
policy. Contrary to what could be expected, this result does
not depend on the enforcement technology that both countries employ. The Ricardian assumption is not crucial either
and a generalization of the model is introduced.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an institution
where countries can get together and negotiate mutually beneficial trade agreements. When countries set their tariffs unilaterally, they hurt other countries because they improve their
own terms of trade at the expense of others’ terms of trade.
This creates a Prisoner’s Dilemma where countries would
be better off if they all lowered their tariffs, but in fact they
do not have the incentive to do so unilaterally. In order to remove this inefficiency, international cooperation is required
and is obtained through the WTO. A key element why international cooperation enhances efficiency is the assumption
that freer trade increases world output. This chapter shows
that a similar reasoning can be applied to migration policy.
Most theoretical models of migration coincide in concluding that the free movement of factors contributes to better
allocation of resources at the world level. In most cases, the
upper estimate of these efficiency gains is notably superior to
the efficiency gains that can be expected from, for example,
free trade. The typical explanation about why these immense
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efficiency gains are not obtained through international cooperation is that the movement of people has opposing effects
on immigrant receiving and emigrant-sending countries.
Immigrant-receiving countries tend to ask for lower migration whereas emigrant-sending countries tend to ask for freer
migration, at least in terms of low-skill migrants.
However, as of 2004, there were at least 176 bilateral
agreements on migration issues. One useful starting point to
address the economic justification behind all of these is to
incorporate the arguments that are currently given for signing
bilateral migration agreements. According to the background
paper for the joint IOM/World Bank/WTO Trade and Migration Seminar (2004), the reasons why migrant-receiving
countries sign these agreements are combating irregular
migration, responding to labor market needs of temporary or
permanent nature, and promoting economic links with sending countries. On the other hand, the reasons why sending
states agree to sign these bilateral agreements are relieving labor surpluses, protecting the rights of their nationals
abroad, and limiting the effects of brain drain by ensuring the
return of their nationals.
The models presented in this chapter concentrate on the
first point of both sets of objectives, that is, the reason for
immigrant-receiving countries to sign an agreement will be
the will to combat irregular migration. For some reason, they
will consider that additional immigration is welfare-reducing. On the contrary, emigrant sending countries will want to
relieve their labor market surplus, that is, they will consider
that additional emigration is welfare-improving for them.
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